The global financial crisis that started in 2007 sparked several academic debates about the role that financial sector regulators played in the crisis and prompted policy reforms in the financial supervision architectures of several countries. This book focuses on the question of what accountability, independence, transparency and, more generally, governance mechanisms applicable to financial regulators can better contribute to building responsive, responsible and effective regulatory and supervisory frameworks that tackle the weaknesses of the pre-crisis regimes. It re-visits the concepts of accountability and independence of financial regulators as well as the main economic theories underlying financial services policy-making, in light of the crisis experience. In addition, it critically examines the post-crisis institutional frameworks of financial regulation and supervision in the EU, the US and Canada with a view to assessing whether the financial regulators of the post-global financial crisis era are well suited to effectively address the challenges and threats that global financial markets pose to the stability, integrity and good functioning of financial systems as well as to the protection of consumers, investors and society at large.

Table of Contents:
CONTENTSPreface and acknowledgements Foreword List of contributors Responsive-and-responsible financial regulation in the aftermath of the global financial crisisPablo Iglesias-Rodriguez 1. Introduction 2. Responsive-and-responsible financial regulators 2.1. The dimensions of responsive-and-responsible financial regulation and the pre-crisis failures of financial regulators 2.1.1. The pursuing of the statutory mandates of financial regulation and supervision 2.1.2. The unbiased pursuing of the interests of stakeholders within the financial realm 2.1.3. The pursuing of social returns 3. The role of accountability in responsive-and-responsible financial regulation 4. Contents and structure of the book Part I. THE CONTRIBUTION OF ACCOUNTABILITY, INDEPENDENCE AND ECONOMIC THEORY TO RESPONSIVE-AND-RESPONSIBLE FINANCIAL REGULATIONFinancial institutions and accountability mechanismsRosa Maria Lastra 1. Introduction 2. Accountability, legitimacy and transparency 3. Political and technical accountability 4. Monetary and supervisory independence and accountability 5. Concluding observations Central bank governance, society and politicians: the tale of independenceDonato Masciandaro 1. Introduction 2. Designing the central bank governance and the role of independence: insights from the economic literature 3. Citizens, politicians and the design of the central bank independence: the theoretical framework 4. The central bank independence before and after the crisis: ups and downs 5. Conclusion The ultrarational illusion of finance. Economics and policymakingXose Carlos Arias and Anton Costas 1. Introduction 2. When a theory is more than an argument: the efficient market hypothesis 3. From theory to an entire belief system 4. The EMH in the wake of the storm: a shift in paradigm? 5. Conclusions Part II. POST-CRISIS ARCHITECTURES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND CANADA: ACCOUNTABILITY AND RESPONSIVENESS AND RESPONSIBILITYPart II.1. THE EUROPEAN UNIONGoverning financial market regulation: a cascade from intergovernmental bank resolution, to prudential regulation, to conduct regulationNicholas Dorn 1. Scope and introduction 2. Comparative perspectives: market conduct regulation 3. Heads of prudential agencies: appointment the norm 4. Intergovernmentality: new lynchpin for banking regulation 5. National parliaments: democracy or dispersal 6. Conundrums of the new political architecture 7. Acknowledgements The European Securities and Markets Authority: accountability towards EU institutions and stakeholdersCarmine Di Noia and Matteo Gargantini 1. Introduction 2. The creation of ESMA 3. Independence and accountability of financial regulators: an overview 4. ESMA accountability: governance and procedures 4.1. The governance of ESMA 4.1.1. The governing bodies of the authority 4.1.2. The Securities and Markets Stakeholder Group 4.2. The performance of regulatory and supervisory functions 4.2.1. The regulatory powers of ESMA 4.2.1.1. The reformed regulatory architecture 4.2.1.2. Strengthening regulatory harmonisation. The new quasi-rulemaking powers 4.2.1.3. The role of the Securities and Markets Stakeholder Group 4.2.2. The supervisory powers of ESMA 4.2.2.1. Cross-sectoral supervisory powers: addressing national competent authorities and market participants 4.2.2.2. ESMA as a single EU supervisor: the case of credit rating agencies 5. Evaluating the regulatory and supervisory architecture: some reform proposals 5.1. In the shadow - or in the light? - of Meroni and Romano. The institutional tensions framing the powers of ESMA 5.2. Evaluation of efficiency. Rulemaking 5.2.1. Reform proposals for rulemaking functions: centralization vs. monopolization 5.2.2. Feasibility according to the Meroni doctrine and the EU Treaties 5.3. Evaluation of efficiency. Supervision 5.3.1. Reform proposals for supervisory functions: integration vs. uniformity The role of civil society in EU financial regulationGuillaume Prache 1. Introduction: a crucial and outstanding issue for the European economy and democracy 2. The current representation of financial services users and of the civil society at large 2.1. The creation of Better Finance (the European Federation of Financial Services Users) in 2009 2.2. The creation of Finance Watch in 2011 3. Competencies are not the main issue for a balanced role between the financial sector and civil society 3.1. 'Level one' EU authorities 3.2. 'Level two' EU authorities 4. Resources: one of the key unfulfilled requirements identified by the EC since 2009 4.1. Emerging support for European civil society organisations involved in financial services policy 4.2. Improved support to individual user experts in 'level one' European authorities 4.3. Inadequate support to user experts in 'level two' European authorities 5. No equal access to the European authorities 5.1. No or unbalanced representation in EU consultative bodies 5.2. The governance of EU authorities 5.3. The events organised by the international public financial authorities 5.4. The participation of EU politicians and executives to outside initiatives and events 5.5. The meetings of EU officials with third parties 6. Conclusion: time for change Part II.2. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICAFinancial stability rearticulated: institutional reform, post-crisis governance and the new regulatory landscape in the United StatesDavid S. Bieri 1. Overview 2. The quest for financial stability 3. The institutional arrangements of U.S. financial regulation 3.1. Micro-prudential entities 3.2. Macro-prudential framework 4. The CFPB as a post-crisis response 4.1. Institutional focus and policy mandate4.2. Financial stability as a public good 4.3. Regulatory governance and the accountability challenge 4.3.1. Global governance 4.3.2. National accountability 5. Regulatory lessons from the recent financial crisis The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority: not self-regulation after allHester Peirce 1. The emergence of FINRA 2. FINRA's functions 3. FINRA's accountability structure 4. FINRA's comparative lack of accountability 5. FINRA's regulatory aspirations 6. Conclusion Part II.3. CANADAWhy opacity is just not good enough: the effectiveness and accountability of Canada's Office of the Superintendent of Financial InstitutionsIan Roberge and Dona M. Dunea 1. The effectiveness and accountability of financial services sector regulators 1.1. Effectiveness 1.2. Accountability 2. Canada 2.1. Effectiveness 2.2. Accountability 3. Key lessons